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OKLAHOMA
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 38 SPECIAL ISSUE NUMBER 5
NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS
OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
HENRY BELLMON*
It will probably take a crisis to awaken Americans to what is happening
to the nation's food supply. The U.S. should be paying attention not only
to the food supply but also to what is happening to U.S. strategic resources.
What the United States seems to be doing is dismantling and exporting its
industry in the area of minerals and other resources. The same thing is true
of U.S. agribusiness. Right now, the news media is predicting that the farm
credit system in this country is near collapse. It was reported that it will prob-
ably require 5 to 15 billion dollars to bail out the farm credit system. This
report comes at a time when the Reagan administration is diligently trying
to hold down government spending. The U.S. federal deficit exceeds 200 billion
dollars and to ask the U.S. Treasury for another 6, 8, 10, maybe 15 billion
dollars for the farm credit system is going to be a severe shock to Congress
and the administration.
The situation in Oklahoma is severe. In the Enid District of the Federal
Land Bank, which includes the counties of Garfield, Major, Grant, and
Alfalfa, there are more than a hundred farm foreclosures in progress. In one
small area of the state, one hundred family farmers are being pushed out.
Similar conditions exist all across the farm belt. It is probably worse in the
Omaha District of the farm credit system, but probably not quite as bad in
the Southeast. It is, however, a serious problem across the country.
In addition to the farm credit system, the rural banking system has also
been badly shaken. Americans will see more and more land placed on the
market with fewer people able to buy. With less and less credit available,
the situation will develop a domino effect. At the same time, the agribusiness
sector of the United States' food system is being devastated. For example,
International Harvester, probably the oldest farm machinery company in the
country, is out of business. In addition, Allis Chalmers has been taken over
by a German firm.
* Former U.S. Senator from Oklahoma and Member of the Senate Agricuture Committee.
Also a former Governor of the State of Oklahoma.
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The fertilizer business is also in financial peril. A great deal of phosphate
is mined in Florida. The mines are being depleted, and within ten to fifteen
years most will be abandoned. Once, the plans were to open new mines in
North Carolina and have them in production as the older mines become
depleted. The problem is that for five consecutive years companies have suf-
fered losses in the fertilizer business. There is no way to project a reasonable
return from such an investment. Very few reasons exist to continue investing
in a business that seems to be on a perpetual toboggan.
Food production belongs high on the list of strategic resources. It should
be considered as important as the United States and Soviet Union arms
relationship.
In this country food abundance has always been taken for granted. Despite
our current excess production capacity, that may not be true much longer.
The U.S. had a brief period of near scarcity in the early 1970s after the Soviet
Union bought all U.S. surplus grain. During the period after World War II,
our farm program was used as an incentive to encourage production. During
the war, the U.S. government installed high support prices in an attempt to
get farmers to produce maximum yields because our Allies needed the food.
After the war, much of the world's agricultural producing land was devastated,
so it was necessary for the U.S. to put forth the maximum effort to feed
Europe, Japan, and the USSR. Thus, a program of incentives was developed
to get producers to grow food. The incentive program became politically
popular. Consequently, it was difficult for politicians to reduce those support
levels and bring prices down to realistic levels. The result was that by the
1960s or late 1950s the U.S. had accumulated a large surplus of many com-
modities. Some commodities, like potatoes and eggs, were perishable and had
to be destroyed. Others, like grain, were stored.
By the early 1970s the U.S. government was still holding about I billion,
200 million bushels of unwanted grain. In that period the Soviet Union had
serious crop failures. The Soviets made the decision that, rather than follow
their past pattern of lowering protein in the diet and reducing the amount
of grain fed to animals, they would buy U.S. grain. The Soviets did not in-
form the United States of this decision. They simply sent over a team of grain
buyers. The buyers went to different cities and contacted different private
grain traders. The Soviets dealt privately and secretly, and it was not until
all transactions were concluded and about a billion bushels of U.S. grain was
purchased that the U.S., the world, and the grain business realized what had
taken place.
After American companies sold the Soviets the billion bushels of grain,
it was necessary for them to buy the grain, which they tried to do quietly.
If anyone had known that the transactions had taken place, the price would
have shot up. As it was, they were able to get their trades covered before
the markets reacted. What followed was a rapid escalation in grain prices.
In certain areas wheat prices doubled within a few months. The final result
was sharp inflation and some scarcity of food. This caused a political panic
in Washington. President Nixon was forced by political considerations to em-
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bargo grain exports in 1973 or 1974. He chose to cut off the export of grain,
not only to the Soviet Union, but also to all foreign customers. This created
a particular problem in Japan.
Japan was trading with the U.S. because we were a reliable food supplier
and because of a large trade imbalance in its favor. The Japanese were trying
to reduce the imbalance by buying American farm products. In Japan soy-
beans are part of the human diet. They are eaten as a source of protein. The
price of a soybean curd patty at that time was about 35 cents. When the
U.S. shut off soybean exports to Japan, the price went from 35 cents to one
dollar and 50 cents. This created considerable political unrest in Japan.
Japanese politicians were angry because they felt the U.S. was keeping soy-
beans to feed pigs, and they were going to have to deny food to their people.
That is not a palatable political choice. In a case like this, their people lose.
Japan made the decision never again to be so dependent on the U.S. for
foodstuffs. The U.S. destroyed its reputation as a dependable food supplier
and a reliable food source. The result was that Japan and other countries
began to develop alternative sources of food, particularly in Brazil.
The Soviet grain sale has had a tremendous long-range impact on U.S.
agriculture. Primarily, it triggered higher grain prices, higher values for land,
higher costs for machinery, and the rapid expansion of food production. I
recall Earl Butz, who was then Secretary of Agriculture, telling me that since
there was a food shortage, he had decided to bring into production 55 million
acres of idle land that had been set aside by various farm commodity pro-
grams. The message to farmers was "Plant, fence row to fence row." I also
remember Senator Bob Dole, of Kansas, saying that Kansas farmers were
going to have a big problem that year because they would not be able to
get their wheat to market. The farmers had even planted the roads in wheat!
He was kidding, but it was almost that bad.
Farmers plowed up grassland. They brought all their land into production
because attractive economic incentives existed. This produced shortages of
chemicals, fertilizers, tractors, and combines. When a country suddenly ex-
pands production to that extent, there are dislocation problems. In addition,
the aggressive farm operators, especially the younger ones, took on huge debts
to expand their operations and become more efficient. They bought new and
better equipment. Many of these people are now out of business. They did
not go quietly, however.
After the sale to the Soviets, Senator Talmadge, who was chairman of the
Senate Agriculture Committee, sent Hubert Humphrey and me to Moscow
to review what had happened. In the Soviet Union, Hubert Humphrey was
well known and quite popular. He had been there as Vice-President when
Khrushchev was leader of the Soviet Union. Hubert Humphrey was able to
open many doors in the Soviet Union, and we were able to talk to anyone
who could make a contribution to our understanding of Soviet policy. We
talked to many Soviet cabinet officers. We talked to the head of the National
Academy of Science, and we went to the universities to talk to research peo-
ple. We talked to the shipping people, the finance people, and the Minister
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of Agriculture. The general reaction was this: You Americans had a billion
bushels of grain that you did not need. It was surplus; you were paying storage
on it; you were trying to get rid of it. We needed it. We played by your
rules. You did not expect us to buy an ad in the Wall Street Journal and
announce that we were going to buy a billion bushels of grain, did you? We
may be Communists, but we are not fools. We sent our people over there
quietly. They bought on your terms from your grain salesmen and we think
you should be thankful for what we did, rather than criticizing our purchase.
They then talked to us about their idea that this should be the first of a contin-
uing trade relationship in food.
The Soviet's other message was that the U.S. and the Soviet Union are
natural trading partners. At that time, the Soviet Union was interested in the
U.S. investing 8 billion dollars in building a gas pipeline and gathering a com-
pression system to bring the gas from the northern regions in Siberia to
Murmansk, where it would be liquified and shipped to markets around the
world. Of course, Hubert Humphrey did not have 8 billion dollars, but the
Soviets felt that the U.S. needed the gas and that the Soviet Union should
supply ttle gas. The Soviets told us that they would like to work out a lasting
trade relationship where they would furnish the United States access to their
abundant natural resources, including strategic minerals. In return, the Soviet
Union wanted access to U.S. food and technology. Those are the two things
the Soviet Union realized it was going to need and the two areas in which
-it felt the U.S. and Soviet Union could work out lasting trade relationships.
Another experience in the Soviet Union relating to this same subject con-
cerns Senator Abe Ribicoff of Connecticut. In 1978, Ribicoff led a delega-
tion to the Soviet Union. Ribicoff's family had lived in an area of Poland
that later became a part of the Soviet Union. The delegation went to the Soviet
Union for a meeting with their so-called parliamentarians. The Soviet Union
has an institution called the Supreme Soviet, which is a facade that passes
as a parliament. Members consider themselves parliamentarians.
The meetings lasted about six hours a day and continued for five days.
They were shouting matches. The same refrains came up over and over again;
the USSR does not want a war, and we should be friends; the USSR is a
peace-loving nation. The U.S. delegation was made up of capable debaters.
Sam Nunn of Georgia, for example, has considerable knowledge of military
operations. John Glenn was there and he knows rocketry. When our people
seemed to prevail in the discussion, the Soviet civilians would turn to the
military for answers. We could not escape the conclusion that in the Soviet
Union, the military is the final authority. The civilians seemed dependent upon
the military for decisions. If this is true, one might conclude that the military
is probably not going to allow the Soviet Union to become heavily dependent
on the U.S. for food. The Soviet Union will want to purchase food when
it can get it at a bargain. It is doubtful, however, that the Soviets would
become dependent on the United States as Japan did prior to the embargo.
Right now the world is awash with grain. For example, China was a food
importer five years ago. During the last five years, however, it has increased
food production by 52 percent. It is astonishing that a nation as large as China
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with a population of more than 1 billion is able to increase its food supply
10 percent a year for five consecutive years. China is now a grain exporter.
Also, India, historically short of food, is now exporting grain. The Common
Market countries, particularly Germany and France, are large grain exporters.
They are subsidizing their exports to take away U.S. markets. The traditional
exporting countries, such as Canada, Brazil, Argentina, Australia, Turkey,
and Thailand, all have grain to sell. So, the Soviets do not necessarily need
grain from the U.S. The Soviet Union can get it from wherever it wants,
but it will buy in the United States when it can get grain at a better deal
than it can elsewhere.
Americans should remember when talking about strategic materials that food
is basically a renewable resource. This is, however, not totally true. Nutrients,
such as nitrogen, phosphates, and potash, must be placed back in the soil.
Luckily for the U.S., our country has an abndance of these plant foods.
The problem is whether these materials are economic to produce.
In conclusion, one should not worry about food trade between the Soviet
Union and the United States as far as impact on defense or upon the strategic
relationship, as long as Americans keep a few things in mind. First, the U.S.
needs to insist that the USSR pay for what it gets. As long as the United
States is draining the Soviets' resources to buy food, it creates no problem
for American strategic balance. It would be a problem, however, if the U.S.
were lending the Soviets money. I would strongly object to any arrangement
that allowed the Soviets to buy food under an eat now, pay later plan. The
United States must insist that the Soviets pay cash for the food it buys.
Second, the U.S. should be a reliable source of food. There is no way the
U.S. can bludgeon the Soviet Union by export embargos. President Carter
discovered this when he cut off U.S. wheat sales. He did great damage to
the U.S. grain producers, but he did not cause the Soviets to go hungry. The
Soviets simply went to Canada, Australia, and elsewhere to get everything
they needed. The U.S. should learn that the Soviet Union, for all of its pro-
blems and all of its shortcomings, is hungry for recognition as the world power
it has become. It does not accept the notion that the United States is going
to slap it on the wrist. The Soviets consider that to be an insult and will react
like most people do when insulted.
In summary, with grain supplies abundant worldwide, little significant
negative national security implications exist with the U.S. and Soviet Union
agricultural trade, as long as the U.S. is paid in cash. American traders, which
are private grain companies dealing with the Soviet buyers, should be free
to sell whatever they can, provided they get paid. There are, however, serious
potential national security implications for the nation's food supply because
of current domestic economic policies. The high rate of interest is harming
American agriculture. The strong dollar makes it difficult for the U.S. to
compete for grain sales abroad. Trade restraints have destroyed the United
States' reputation as a reliable source of food. If this continues without cor-
rection, U.S. agribusiness may ultimately be decimated to the point that the
U.S. would be a food-short nation. This would not be because of the Soviets,
but because of America's own short-sightedness.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1985
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol38/iss5/2
